[Milton-L] oops, "proud" not "vain"
jamesrovira at gmail.com
Wed Apr 2 10:01:02 EDT 2014
It could be that Milton deliberately used a less than precise term to
describe the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil because he
himself believed the type of fruit was either unknown, irrelevant, or both.
In this case, the ambiguity is the point, and registering ambiguity is to
get Milton's point.
Saying that the nature or type of the fruit is irrelevant existentializes
the act of eating rather than attributes some kind of magical property to
the fruit itself, which I think is more consistent with Milton's
presentation of and emphasis upon character. Satan's physical appearance
certainly isn't trustworthy, and where he goes is hell, as he himself is
hell, regardless of his physical nature.
On Wed, Apr 2, 2014 at 9:48 AM, Gregory Machacek <
Gregory.Machacek at marist.edu> wrote:
> (I'm prepping the Limbo of Vanities for class and got a wire crossed.
> Here's the correct version of my reply to Salwa)
> Salwa, you claim that "we have to imagine it as readers before we can
> picture the action involved with it" and in the next breath tell us that
> the poem prevents us from being able to imagine it to the degree we "have
> to" do: "the 'apple' was a generic term for a group of fruits," and
> therefore could be a peach. If the most precise term Milton gives us for
> imagining the variety of what he elsewhere calls just a "fruit" is itself a
> category word, how do we then do this imagining that we "have to" do?
> And do we have to do it? *Must* "poems as poems" prioritize imagination
> in this way? I know that presupposition is plausible and deeply ingrained
> in us. But might a given poem challenge us to adopt the "rational
> viewpoint of God" over the imagination that other poems (and even it
> itself) do routinely expect us to exercise? Particularly a poem that
> explicitly states that fancy serves "reason as chief," a poem that links
> "imagination" with "aery things," not to mention "*proud*" Satanic
> ambitions (2.10).
> The only "actions involved with" the fruit that I can remember being
> called on to imagine are plucking and eating (and avoiding), I can picture
> those actions relative to a generic "fruit" as easily as to a generic
> "apple." (The rapidity of 9.781, "she pluckt, she eat" does seem to me to
> rule out fruits that would need to be peeled, but still rules in many other
> kinds of fruit.)
> That is all to say, might the poem be calling on us to check our natural
> desire to know what variety of fruit this is and instead regard it as (as
> God calls it) a fruit, and "know to know no more"? All in service of
> sustaining the view/resolution that the*only* important thing about it
> is that it has been forbidden.
> These may sound like rhetorical questions, but I'm in fact genuinely
> asking them, because, while I do believe what I say about the fruit, I've
> never realized what a profound ramification that has for the operation of
> our imaginations in reading this poem. So I'd like the list members' help
> in working these thoughts out, even if it means that we're back to one of
> those questions that, as John Leonard pointed out, refuse to stay settled
> and periodically re-emerge on this list.
> Greg Machacek
> Professor of English
> Marist College
> Milton-L mailing list
> Milton-L at lists.richmond.edu
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> Milton-L web site: http://johnmilton.org/
Dr. James Rovira
Associate Professor of English
Blake and Kierkegaard: Creation and Anxiety
Text, Identity, Subjectivity
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