[Milton-L] Fish and Milton

[Michael Gillum]

Suppose Estragon utters an ambiguous remark before hanging himself from the
tree, and the rope doesn't break. As Vladimir chooses between two
alternative interpretations of this utterance, A and B, he rejects B on the
basis that "The Gogo I knew couldn't have meant that." Did Estragon then
succeed in "getting it [the meaning A] said"? Was Didi wrong to invoke the
context of Gogo's normal thought and behavior, or could such contexts be
considered part of the "system of communication"?

Michael


On 5/9/09 6:24 PM, "Harold Skulsky" <hskulsky at smith.edu> wrote:

> (3) In the absence of contextual cues to the contrary, Vladimir will follow
> the default strategy of assuming that Estragon succeeded in saying what he
> meant to say. (This assumption is one variant of the so-called Rule of
> Charity.)
> 
> (4) If it turns out that Estragon failed to say what he meant to say, his
> intention may still be retrievable, partly by referring to cases in which
> Estragon succeeded in saying something relevant, or by relying on background
> information about Estragon. But these external routes to Estragon's intention
> are strictly irrelevant to what Estragon actually succeeded in getting said.
> 
> Point (4) is why intention is strictly irrelevant to the meaning of what one
> says -  to the meaning of one's utterance or text - and hence why
> intentionalism is false.