[Milton-L] historicism, formalism, etc.

[James Rovira]

Thanks much for the reply, Prof. Fleming.  My apologies for confusing you
with Ray Fleming.  Good company to be in, though.

First, and most importantly, I did not intend to establish a hierarchy with
my distinction between an emphasis upon the objective (type 1) in literary
interpretation and the subjective (type 2): my point is that these are two
distinct, though related, approaches with different concerns, and that both
are equally valid.  The point here is only that they differ in the focus of
their attention: outward, toward the object being interpreted, or inward,
toward the interpreter.  Your position seems to be that there really is
nothing but the subjective in literary interpretation, so we don't talk
about the "meaning" of a text (objectively) but our "understanding" of it
(subjectively) -- and what the process of understanding entails.    This
latter question is perfectly legitimate and I don't question that Gadamer
sheds light on the subject.

Yes, I agree that my perception of the objective is dependent upon my
perception of the subjective, as you say here:

<Yet understanding is, in Gadamer's view, best theorized as an experience
that we undergo. Thus your "type 1" depends on "type 2." That is Gadamer's
view. You are asking a question he is trying to answer.>>

That is what I attempted to say in my last email here:

<<Thus, type 2 readings -make possible the objectivity of type 1
readings-.>>

A clear understanding of the subjective makes it possible for us to
understand that which is -other than ourselves-: it creates the objective,
so to speak.  But once it has done so, we can talk about texts objectively,
at least in terms of difference from ourselves.

I'm having a little bit of difficulty with the word "understanding" and how
it is being used.  It's not clear to me that it fully eliminates
epistemological questions: your critique of the infinite regress of
objective knowledge is a critique of a specific -epistemology-, a question
of "how can we know."  You seem to me to resolve the epistemological
question negatively in order to replace it with some notion of
"understanding."  As a result, your position is made necessary by a dubious
conclusion epistemological  to begin with.  To say this is not about
epistemology is to beg the question.  I am questioning the assumptions upon
which your argument is based, not the argument itself.

Jim R
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