[Milton-L] historicism, formalism, etc. (Skulsky)

[Harold Skulsky]

James Fleming's original claim was that historicist interpretation runs
in a tight and vicious circle: "The only way to know that ones
interpretation had reached it [i.e.,"what a given text means, etc.]
would be by comparison with an understanding of the interpretandum just
as it is." In other words, my evidence for fact X (the meaning of a
given text) is validated by my understanding of fact X - even though
(unfortunately) my understanding of fact X is validated by my evidence
for fact X. 

Professor Fleming now claims that historicist interpretation runs not
in a circle but off the cliff of a vicious infinite regress: "The
context [of a given text], from the point of view of interpretative
work, consists of nothing other than a set of interpretanda. Valid
understanding of these determines valid interpretation of the primary
interpretandum." But this is a different claim; "determines" does not
mean "presupposes." On the new claim, my evidence for fact X is
validated by my evidence for fact Y,  my evidence for fact Y is
validated by my evidence for fact Z, and so on to infinity - where X, Y,
and Z stand for the meanings of various texts.

In its general form, this kind of argument would encourage us to
suppose that one can never know any fact at all, since the process of
justification (as defined) goes on without limit, each succeeding
justification requiring another. But this is a strange notion of
justification. 

An example close to home may help here.

When Professor Fleming complies with my request for help in
understanding his argument, he does so because he has succeeded in
understanding my request. His understanding was based on evidence that
he takes for granted in the absence of a reasonable doubt. His
understanding is no less genuine and well grounded for that. No
knowledge claim of mere human beings commits the claimant to an
infinitely nested series of justifications. 

Yet Professor Fleming's initial problem in understanding my request is
no different in principle from the problem of understanding any other
utterance, no matter how ancient and elaborate and culturally remote; we
accept the standard evidence for the constitution of the language of the
utterance, including the grammar of the language, the meaning
assignments to its vocabulary, the pragmatic rules that control its
reference in varying circumstances of utterance, and (last but not
least) the common understandings shared by the utterance maker and her
target audience. It is always possible that we are mistaken about any or
all of these items. But bare possibility is not a reasonable ground for
doubt. We go on our standard evidence until reasonable grounds for doubt
are provided. Until then our evidence (to resort to the usual jargon) is
prima facie undefeated. That is what a knowledge claim is all about -
and not only in the rarefied world of literary interpretation.

Professor Fleming's kind of argument has been a steady presence in
Western thought from Gorgias and Theodorus to Gadamer to Quine on
"gavagai" to Derrida and his epigoni to the much-missed Richard Rorty. I
remember debating with Gadamer about the Verschmelzung der Horizonte
many years ago, during his triumphant visit to the States. If anything
resembled a fall into the blackness of a mise en abîme, it was that
conversation, with its ancient and predictable moves and countermoves.
Gadamer crowned the occasion by rising to serve Liebfraumilch to each of
his hosts, of whom I was one.

I will read Professor Fleming's reply, should he be generous enough to
make one, with pleasure and an open mind. My failure to reply should not
be construed as agreement.