[Milton-L] Knowledge, free will, etc.

mgrattan at ucsd.edu mgrattan at ucsd.edu
Thu Nov 13 18:45:18 EST 2008


Dear Larry,

Perhaps I'm looking for signification of the Son's elevation in the wrong
place, and if so then perhaps someone can point me in the right direction.

It seems that for me there is an issue with separating God and the Son in
terms of divine power after God grants him use of his power.

The part for me that makes this claim hazy is the last line: "all his
Father in him shon."

This really seems to me that the Son is not merely being protected by
God's power but that he now has it within him. Does the idea that he has
no native omnipotence, or any other of God's qualities, suggest that he is
uniquely and eternally distinct from God?

I wonder if Milton's Arianism insists that the two remain separate?

Again, thank you for the clarification.
Michael

> Michael,
>
> You speak of the Son's elevation to "co-equal status in terms of power,"
> and cite these passages from Book VII:
>
> *         Mean while the Son
>
> On his great Expedition now appeer'd,
>
> Girt with Omnipotence, with Radiance crown'd Of Majestie Divine, Sapience
> and Love [ 195 ] Immense, and all his Father in him shon.
>
>
>
> *         And earlier, in Book VI:
>
> Effulgence of my Glorie, Son belov'd, [ 680 ] Son in whose face invisible
> is beheld Visibly, what by Deitie I am, And in whose hand what by Decree I
> doe, Second Omnipotence
>
>
>
> He is indeed able to defeat Satan, but not with his own native
> omnipotence, glory, majesty divine. He is rather operating "girt" with
> these things, not possessing them in himself. His glory is not his own but
> is his father's, and in that relationship is "Second Omnipotence." There
> can logically be no second omnipotence, otherwise omnipotence isn't omni
> at all if another possesses it in equal measure. The Son is merely the
> Father's instrument for destruction, and only armed with his father's
> weapons and chariot, is he able to do as he does; he is absorbed, as it
> were, into his father's all-power for the job at hand.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: milton-l-bounces at lists.richmond.edu
> [mailto:milton-l-bounces at lists.richmond.edu] On Behalf Of
> mgrattan at ucsd.edu
> Sent: Tuesday, November 11, 2008 3:47 PM
> To: John Milton Discussion List
> Subject: Re: [Milton-L] Knowledge, free will, etc.
>
>
>
> Jefferey,
>
> I second Margaret's thanks, and I must acknowledge "promoting" the Son as
>
> an error, although God refers to the Son as "Messiah his anointed King" in
>
> VI.718.
>
>
>
> The supposition that the Son was created as an Ethereal Power and later
>
> promoted makes sense if he was choosing to follow God's request for a
>
> volunteer. This would mean, as you point out, that he becomes the Son (I'm
>
> having trouble coming up with terms to differentiate pre/post elevation)
>
> after choosing to sacrifice himself. The other possibility is that he was
>
> elevated upon creation or shortly thereafter, coequal and therefore not
>
> operating with freewill (just will), but then the whole ceremony of God
>
> asking for a volunteer other than the Son is somewhat of a charade.
>
> The temptation (pun intended) for me is to choose the latter, especially
>
> considering the role he plays in defeating Satan as described in Book VII:
>
>
>
> Mean while the Son
>
> On his great Expedition now appeer'd,
>
> Girt with Omnipotence, with Radiance crown'd
>
> Of Majestie Divine, Sapience and Love [ 195 ]
>
> Immense, and all his Father in him shon.
>
>
>
> And earlier, in Book VI:
>
> Effulgence of my Glorie, Son belov'd, [ 680 ]
>
> Son in whose face invisible is beheld
>
> Visibly, what by Deitie I am,
>
> And in whose hand what by Decree I doe,
>
> Second Omnipotence
>
>
>
> It seems to me that here the Son is elevated to coequal status in terms of
>
> power, which is why he is able to defeat Satan when other archangels could
>
> not. Again, for me this troubles what is often considered the pinnacle of
>
> a free choice
>
>
>
> I guess that your comment about death as the state of one choosing to cut
>
> oneself off from God suggests that death, as it describes ones relation to
>
> God, is significant in exercising true freewill. Without understanding
>
> death, isn't obedience merely mechanical? God seems to have reserved the
>
> punishment of death exclusively for man. Yet when it is offered as a
>
> consequence / condition of or punishment for disobedience, man has no
>
> concept (dare I say no possibility of conceiving) of what this is.
>
> Raphael's warning, while a fine and lengthy description of disobedience,
>
> doesn't help with this point either. Others who disobey suffer all kinds
>
> of punishments, except death. (And so too the Son, who specifically
>
> ensures that the death he will suffer will be short.) So what started out
>
> as a rather simple query for me has become...entangled.
>
> Thanks again for the response, and sorry to take up so much space with my
>
> musings.
>
> Michael
>
>
>
>> Michael Grattan asked a couple of questions. Here's my response to the
>
>> latter question first:
>
>>
>
>> I have another question regarding freewill. When God relates to Jesus,
>
>>
>
>> Such I created all th' Ethereal Powers [ 100 ]
>
>> And Spirits, both them who stood and them who faild;
>
>> Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
>
>> Is Jesus included in "Ethereal Powers," and if not, does he have
>> freewill
>
>> (or does God)? Obviously he exercises "freewill" when offering to suffer
>
>> death for man's salvation, but as a manifestation of God, wouldn't he be
>
>> somehow separate from other Ethereal Powers?
>
>> Jeffery Hodges responds:
>
>>
>
>> First, I doubt that we should be using "Jesus" to name the Son at this
>
>> point, for Jesus doesn't appear until Paradise Regained, so far as I
>> know.
>
>> This is the pre-incarnate Son.
>
>>
>
>> Second, I suppose that the Son is one of the ethereal powers because
>
>> Milton's theology is Arian. The Son is that one of the ethereal powers
>> who
>
>> has been elevated to Sonship. Could he have freely fallen prior to his
>
>> elevation? That would seemingly follow logically -- unless he came into
>
>> existence in the ceremonial moment of elevation. Could he freely fall
>
>> after the elevation to Sonship? As the divine Son of God, he could no
>
>> longer fall at all, freely or otherwise -- or so I would infer.
>
>>
>
>> As for the first question, which is actually two questions, Matthew
>> wrote:
>
>>
>
>> I have wondered just what was the point of God offering any kind of
>
>> punishment for disobedience, and especially one he knows is foreign to
>
>> Adam.
>
>>
>
>> . . . of all the Trees
>
>> In Paradise that bear delicious fruit
>
>> So various, not to taste that onely Tree
>
>> Of knowledge, planted by the Tree of Life,
>
>> So neer grows Death to Life, what ere Death is, [ 425 ]
>
>> Regardless of the level of God's complicity in letting Satan tempt Adam
>
>> and Eve (or more accurately, just Eve), it seems that God mentions the
>
>> punishment of death as a necessary element for Adam to choose obedience.
>> I
>
>> always thought that the threat of losing Paradise would have been more
>
>> persuasive.
>
>>
>
>> To me it raises a sticky issue of motives for obedience: does one obey
>> out
>
>> of love and loyalty or out of fear of punishment? A student asked if God
>
>> preferred one kind of obedience to the other. I'm not sure.
>
>> I had better let others reply to this in more depth -- since I'm out of
>
>> mine -- but my understanding of Milton's thought is that disobedience to
>
>> God is a free choice to deliberately cut oneself off from God, who is
>> the
>
>> source of life, such that death follows . . . whatever thing death may
>> be.
>
>> In Milton's view, free obedience is better than "mechanical necessity"
>
>> because the latter is not really obedience at all, so -- Milton argues
>> --
>
>> God creates free beings who can make the fruitful, fateful choice to
>> obey
>
>> or disobey. The point is to obey out of love, but disobedience sets in
>
>> motion the 'natural' consequence of cutting oneself off from God as the
>
>> source of life.
>
>>
>
>> The question that arises -- for me anyway -- is this: why could God not
>
>> have created free beings whose choice of disobedience did not cut them
>> off
>
>> from the source of life, but rather resulted in a lesser punishment,
>> e.g.,
>
>> expulsion from the Garden. On this point, I don't know enough about
>
>> Milton. Perhaps he thought that a fateful choice was necessary for a
>> truly
>
>> free individual, namely, that to be radically free, an individual must
>> be
>
>> able to utterly reject God, damn the consequences.
>
>>
>
>> What do others think?
>
>>
>
>> Jeffery Hodges_______________________________________________
>
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>
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>
>
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